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Summary
Ebolaviruses, and the other viral causes of haemorrhagic
fevers (VHF) have always posed special problems for diag-
nostic laboratories. These arise from the rarity of human
infections, minimal documented experience with test deliv-
ery and interpretation, the paucity of established commer-
cial or in-house assays, the lack of clinical material for test
development and validation, the high level containment
required for handling live virus, the ongoing evolution of
the viruses, and the high personal and public health require-
ments for accurate diagnosis. This article addresses the
current situation and the ongoing challenges associated
with delivering timely, high quality and safe testing within
Australia for people exposed as part of the current major
outbreak of Ebolavirus disease (EVD) in Western Africa.
The members of the Public Health Laboratory Network have
developed deliverable and reliable nucleic acid detection
tests, and also have the laboratory capacity to handle the
live viruses if necessary. However delivering and maintain-
ing these services necessitates high levels of experience in
developing and applying tests for exotic and emerging
infections, strong national and international links and col-
laborations, ongoing monitoring and reassessment of test
design and performance, innovative approaches to gener-
ation of positive control material, and a regular quality
assurance program.
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BACKGROUND
Ebolaviruses, and the other viral causes of haemorrhagic fevers
(VHF) with high mortality and the potential for person to
person transmission, have always posed special problems for
diagnostic laboratories. The current large Ebolavirus disease
(EVD) outbreak in West Africa, with cases occurring in
returning healthcare workers in a number of developed
countries, has raised the level of concern and preparedness
in Australia.
The VHF agents are all exotic to Australia and are classed at
the highest biosafety level (BSL-4) and require the highest level
of physical containment (PC-4). It was recognised in the 1990s
that providing the necessary diagnostic support for both sus-
pected and confirmed cases in a timely manner through the
small number of PC-4 laboratories nationally was difficult or
impossible. In 2002, the Public Health Laboratory Network of
Australia pioneered and developed comprehensive guidelines
that included a staged approach to testing for patients with
suspected VHFs. These have been progressively upgraded1 and
allow laboratories to safely conduct testing, other than cultiva-
tion of the virus, within lower level and more widely available
PC-3 or PC-2 laboratories. PC-4 level support for VHF-specific
tests and for virus culture is available at a national level from
the National High Security Quarantine Laboratory (NHSQL) at
the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory
(VIDRL) in Melbourne (Fig. 1).
The other challenge faced is the intermittent and short-lived
nature of previous outbreaks of EVD, which has meant that
there has been very limited test development internationally,
and even less information on test performance and interpret-
ation. Also, in Australia test development has to be carried out
without access to patient material and with tight regulatory
restrictions on the importation and distribution of the Ebola-
viruses within the country.
This article addresses the current situation and the ongoing
challenges associated with delivering timely, high quality and
safe testing within Australia for people exposed as part of the
current major outbreak of EVD in Western Africa.
Ebolaviruses form a genus within the Filoviridae family
(Fig. 2). It is enveloped, with a 19 kb single-stranded negative-
sense RNA genome,2 which codes for one non-structural
protein (L gene: RNA-dependent RNA polymerase) and six
structural proteins: NP gene (major nucleocapsid protein),
VP35 (phosphoprotein), VP40 (membrane-associated matrix
protein), GP (transmembrane glycoprotein/secreted glyco-
protein), VP30 (ribonucleoprotein-associated) and VP24
(membrane associated protein). There are four Ebolavirus
species within Africa: Ebolavirus Zaire (EBOV) first found
in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo; Ebolavirus
Sudan (SUDV); Ebolavirus Bundibugyo (BDBV) first found in
Uganda; and a single case of Ebolavirus Taı¨ Forest (TAFV)
infection in the Coˆte d’Ivoire. Outside Africa, an attenuated
species, Ebolavirus Reston (RESTV), was detected in primates
from the Philippines, with seroconversion in the primate hand-
lers. The current outbreak of EBOV is due to a strain designated
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as Makona,3 which appears to have evolved from Central
African strains as the virus spread toWest Africa in non-human
reservoirs over the last decade or more.4
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR DETECTION
OF EBOV
Virus culture
The filoviruses grow well in Vero and Vero E6 cell lines,
although the cytopathic effect may be difficult to detect without
passaging.2 Cell culture is less sensitive than polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) and can be performed only in a PC-4 laboratory,
so it has very limited use for primary diagnosis. However, it is
valuable for providing virus for sequencing (including whole
genome sequencing) in order to determine the molecular epide-
miology, to monitor changes that may affect the sensitivity and
specificity of the nucleic acid detection tests, to guide further test
development and to provide positive control material for test
evaluation. The last includes the development of improved
antigen detection tests and serological assays. Occasionally it
may be used for sorting out unexpected positive PCR results, for
example in cases occurring outside areas of known activity or
where the illness is atypical; and for unusual situations where a
false negative PCR is suspected, e.g., patients with a strong
clinical and exposure history where the negative result may
reflect a genetic variant or a faulty assay.
Viral nucleic acid detection
PCR-based assays have now become both the standard and
preferred method for the detection of EBOV virus.5 Properly
performed, they are the most sensitive tests, are highly
specific, and can be performed safely in a standard laboratory
environment.
SUDV RNA has been found in a large range of body fluids
and tissues in patients with symptomatic diseases, including
blood, sweat, saliva, urine, semen and breast milk.6 Blood is
regarded as the single most reliable sample for detection and
exclusion of EBOV infection.5 A study under field conditions
from the SUDV outbreak in Uganda in 2001 showed that RNA
was present in the blood on the day of onset of illness, rose over
the first 5–6 days of clinical illness and peaked around
3.5 106 copies/mL in non-fatal cases and 3.5 108 copies/
mL in fatal cases. However, it did not reach reliable detectable
levels (105 copies/mL) until 72 h after onset of illness, so that a
negative PCR in the first 72 h of illness does not exclude
infection.7 There are anecdotal reports of similar early false
negative PCR results in the current EBOV outbreak.8
Oral fluid is recommended5 if a blood sample cannot be
obtained. While it was shown to be as sensitive as serum for
diagnosis in eight patients in the 2004 Republic of Congo
outbreak, data are limited.9 EBOV has been detected in ocular
fluid by PCR and culture for at least 14 weeks,10 semen by PCR
for up to 101 days,11 and it also has been reported in breast milk
in the absence of detection in blood.12
Transient low levels of EBOV have been detected by PCR
(but not virus isolation) in asymptomatic patients in previous
outbreaks,13 but they have not yet been described in the current
outbreak and are not believed to represent an infectious risk.
A number of targets and assays have been used for EBOV
detection: those directed against NP, GP and VP40 gene
sequences are species-specific and possibly lineage-specific
while those directed at L gene sequences can detect all filo-
viruses.14 So performance may vary according to the species of
the ebolavirus, and not all published assays,14 including some
of those approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
in the United States, have been assessed against the current
outbreak strain.15 For example, the two Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) reverse transcription, real-time PCR assays
directed at the NP2 gene and the VP40 gene were evaluated
using the 1976 Mayinga strain, the 1995 Kikwit strain and the
2002 Gabon strain of EBOV. They performed well, but the
sensitivity for the current Makona strain had to be assumed
based on primer and probe sequence homology with the
evaluated strains.
Ongoing genetic evolution of EBOV within the current West
African outbreak may, of course, also affect assay sensitivity
and specificity,4 although there is no evidence of this happening
as yet.
Interestingly, a separate small outbreak of EBOV in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014 was due to a
different variant of the virus (called Lomela strain), reinforcing
the need to be aware of the potential for genetically different
strains to emerge.3
Provided that an appropriate process is used, filoviruses are
inactivated during specimen extraction and lysis,5,16,17 so that
once extraction is performed and the external surfaces are
decontaminated, further testing can be carried out at PC-2
level.1,5 The testing laboratory needs to verify that their extrac-
tion process is adequate to inactivate virus17 and that appro-
priately high standards of laboratory practice are applied.1
Due to the lack of availability of clinical samples for test
development, the validation of the PCR assays in use inter-
nationally is based almost entirely on the use of live virus,
Fig. 1 Staff performing Ebolavirus culture under Physical Containment Level
4 conditions at the National High Security Quarantine Laboratory at VIDRL.
(Image supplied by Julian Druce.)
Fig. 2 Transmission electron micrograph of an Ebolavirus virion. (Image
accessed from the Centers for Disease Control Public Health Image Library,
contributed by Cynthia Goldsmith from the CDC.)
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gamma-irradiated inactivated virus, or target sequences incorp-
orated into a plasmid. These are diluted in water or used to
make mocked clinical samples by diluting in virus-negative
specimens, to provide a technical validation of the assay. The
limit of detection (LOD) may be determined in a number of
ways, but the most meaningful is the level that can be reliably
detected 95% of the time, which provides 95% confidence that
a negative result on the test means that the level is actually
lower than that. LOD may be reported as plaque-forming units
(pfu)/mL (if live or inactivated virus is used) or copies/mL (if
RNA target is used). Unfortunately there is a variable relation-
ship between pfu/mL and copies/mL18 and assay sensitivity
may be affected by the type of specimen used. For example,
using gamma-irradiated virus reduces the sensitivity of
the assays.
During the Ebolavirus outbreak, the Royal College of Path-
ologists of Australasia (RCPA) Quality Assurance Program
(QAP) Biosecurity program rapidly developed simulated speci-
mens based upon RNA transcripts generated using T7 tran-
scription in vitro and plasmids containing the nucleoprotein
(NP), glycoprotein (GP) and L-gene fragments as nucleic acid
test targets. The targets selected were known sequences from
EBOV strain Mayinga (GenBank accession no. AF086833) and
surveys were undertaken in April 2014 and November 2014,
with eight participant laboratories. The laboratories used var-
ious combinations of these targets for the diagnostic PCRs.
A number of commercial kits for detecting EBOV became
available during 2014 and 2015 and a number have been
approved for emergency use by the US FDA.15 These assays
use a range of platforms and vary in sensitivity and, as for in-
house assays, participation in an appropriate external QAP is
essential if they are used. None are yet licensed by the
Therapeutic Goods Administration for use in Australia.
Hence, for the PCR assays in use:
1. they have not been validated to the standards usually
expected, andwe have no realistic likelihood of being able to
do so, as access to clinical material remains very difﬁcult;
2. there are a number of factors that inﬂuence the inter-
pretation of the technical validation of these assays;
3. there is ongoing genetic drift in the circulating viruses that
may modify target sequences and affect assay performance.
Therefore, laboratories undertaking PCR testing for Ebola-
viruses should be experienced in the development and vali-
dation of assays for rare pathogens, and in the use of plasmid
targets, UV inactivated materials and other mocked samples; as
well as having links to national and international sources of
patient material, and to other laboratories performing testing.
The method chosen for diagnostic use should have been shown
to have performed satisfactorily in a suitable external QAP that
is conducted by an organisation with established expertise in
generating samples for evaluation, such as the RCPA QAP
Biosecurity program.
Ideally, the diagnostic PCR should be directed at more than
one reliable target and should use primer and probes known to
match all currently circulating strains. That requires ongoing
monitoring of sequences of circulating virus, with modification
of assays as required, and revalidation of assay performance.
Due to the high personal and public health impact of the
diagnosis of EVD in Australia, all samples found to be positive
or equivocal on PCR are treated as presumptive positives, but
samples must be urgently referred to the National High Security
Quarantine Laboratory at the Victorian Infectious Diseases
Reference Laboratory in Melbourne, or to an appropriate over-
seas reference laboratory, for additional testing before this is
confirmed. Furthermore, for the first case diagnosed in Aus-
tralia, which is yet to happen, the result has to be confirmed in a
designated overseas reference laboratory.19
The interpretation of PCR results must take into account the
nature and timing of the exposure and the clinical history, and
the performance of the particular assay used. A negative PCR
on blood collected less than 72 h after onset of illness is not
currently regarded as reliable for exclusion of EBOV,19,20
although the WHO has accepted a shorter period of 48 h.5 This
may change in the future as test sensitivity improves and more
technical and field use data become available.
For clearance of patients and determination of non-infectiv-
ity, testing for viable virus using a culture method may be
helpful. However, cell culture is slow, relatively insensitive and
has very restricted availability and it may miss low level viable
virus. For those reasons PCR testing has been used as a basis for
clearance of patients. Unfortunately, there is a lack of data
about the correlation of low RNA levels with infectivity.
For a body fluid that has been shown to be positive for EBOV
by PCR, it requires two PCR-negative samples collected at least
one day apart for that sample to be declared non-infectious.5
Viral antigen detection
In-house antigen detection tests, mainly enzyme immunoas-
says, have been developed14 but their poor sensitivity in field
use compared with PCR,6,21 their limited availability, and lack
of validation data means that they have had very little use.
Antigen appears about 3 days post-onset and increases until
death or, in non-fatal cases, persists for 7–16 days.14
Very recently, a rapid immunochromatographic dipstick
immunoassay point-of-care test (ReEBOV Antigen Rapid Test
Kit; Corgenix, USA) that detects the VP40 antigen has been
listed by the World Health Organization.22 It has a reported
sensitivity of 91.8% and a specificity of 84.6% compared with
PCR, and is intended for presumptive testing of symptomatic
individuals, particularly in outbreaks in resource-poor settings
without ready access to PCR-based tests.
ANTIBODY DETECTION TESTS
Antibody detection tests have a limited role in the early
diagnosis of suspected cases as serological responses are too
delayed or entirely absent, particularly in the sicker (and more
infectious) patients. IgM usually appears within 1 week of
onset, peaks at 2–3 weeks, then persists for 60–80 days.21 IgG
persists for years and has been detected more than 10 years after
onset,23 but it is not known whether this indicates immunity to
further infection. Neutralisation tests, if available, must be
performed in a PC-4 laboratory and are generally reserved
for research purposes.
CONCLUSIONS
Laboratory diagnosis of infections due to Ebolaviruses has
posed a number of challenges to laboratories within Australia
and internationally due to the containment requirements for
these viruses, the lack of patient material for test development
and validation, the evolving nature of the virus, and the limited
clinical data to assist test interpretation.
Despite these difficulties, the availability of reliable and
timely testing capacity within Australia is essential, and has
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required innovative approaches to test development and evalu-
ation. Under those circumstances, it is important that testing
is conducted within highly experienced laboratories using a
range of methods of test validations and accompanied by a
rigorous quality assurance program, with regular review and
revalidation.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to the staff of the RCPA QAP
for Biosecurity at the South East Area Laboratory Service,
Randwick, NSW; the Microbiological Security section at
PathWest; and the NHSQL at VIDRL for assistance with
manuscript preparation and provision of images.
Conﬂicts of interest and sources of funding: The authors state
that there are no conﬂicts of interest to disclose.
Address for correspondence: Clin Prof David W. Smith, Department of
Microbiology, PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA, QEII Medical Centre,
Hospital Ave, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia. E-mail: david.smith@health.wa.
gov.au
References
1. Public Health Laboratory Network. Laboratory procedures and precautions
for samples collected from patients with suspected viral haemorrhagic
fevers. Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health, 2014.
Cited 24 Apr 2015. http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/
Content/cda-pubs-other-vhf.htm.
2. Sanchez A, Geisbert TW, Feldmann H. Filoviridae: Marburg and Ebola
viruses. In: Knipe DM, Grifﬁn DE, Lamb RA, editors. Fields Virology. 5th
ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2007; 1409–48.
3. Kuhn JS, Kristian G, Andersen KG, et al. Nomenclature- and database-
compatible names for the two Ebola virus variants that emerged in Guinea
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014. Viruses 2014; 6:
4760–4799.
4. Gire G, Goba A, Andersen K, et al. Genomic surveillance elucidates Ebola
virus origin and transmission during the 2014 outbreak. Science 2014; 345:
1369–72.
5. World Health Organization. Laboratory Guidance for the Diagnosis of
Ebola Virus Disease: Interim Recommendations. 19 September 2014; cited
24 Apr 2015. http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/labora-
tory-guidance/en/.
6. Onyango CO, OpokaML, Ksiazek TG, et al. Laboratory diagnosis of Ebola
hemorrhagic fever during an outbreak in Yambio, Sudan, 2004. J Infect Dis
2007; 196 (Suppl 2): S193–8.
7. Towner JS, Rollin PE, Bausch DG, et al. Rapid diagnosis of Ebola
hemorrhagic fever by reverse transcription-PCR in an outbreak setting
and assessment of patient viral load as a predictor of outcome. J Virol 2004;
78: 4330–41.
8. Chertow DS, Kleine C, Edwards JK, et al. Ebola virus disease inWest Africa -
clinical manifestations and management. N Engl J Med 2014; 371: 2054–7.
9. Formenty P, Leroy EM, Epelboin A, et al. Detection of Ebola virus in oral
ﬂuid specimens during outbreaks of Ebola virus hemorrhagic fever in the
Republic of Congo. Clin Infect Dis 2006; 42: 1521–6.
10. Varkey JB, Shantha JG, Crozier I. Persistence of Ebola virus in ocular ﬂuid
during convalescence. N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 2423–7.
11. Rodriguez LL, De Roo A, Guimard Y, et al. Persistence and genetic
stability of Ebola virus during the outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis 1999; 179 (Suppl 1): S170–6.
12. Moreau M, Spencer C, Gozalbes JG, et al. Lactating mothers infected with
Ebola virus: EBOV RT-PCR of blood only may be insufﬁcient. Euro
Surveill 2015; 20: 21017.
13. Bellan SE, Pulliam JR, Dushoff J, et al. Ebola control: effect of
asymptomatic infection and acquired immunity. Lancet 2014; 384:
1499–500.
14. Reusken C, Niedrig M, Pas S, et al. Identiﬁcation of essential outstanding
questions for an adequate European laboratory response to Ebolavirus Zaire
West Africa 2014. J Clin Virol 2015; 62: 124–34.
15. US Food and Drug Administration. Emergency Use Authorisation. Cited 27
Apr 2015. http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/
MedicalCountermeasures/MCMLegalRegulatoryandPolicyFramework/
ucm182568.htm.
16. Blow JA, Dohm DJ, Negley DL, et al. Virus inactivation by nucleic acid
extraction reagents. J Virol Methods 2004; 119: 195–8.
17. Towner JS, Sealy TK, Ksiazek TG, et al. High-throughput molecular
detection of hemorrhagic fever virus threats with applications for outbreak
settings. J Infect Dis 2007; 196 (Suppl 2): S205–12.
18. Trombley AR, Wachter L, Garrison J, et al. Comprehensive panel of real-
time TaqManTM polymerase chain reaction assays for detection and
absolute quantiﬁcation of ﬁloviruses, arenaviruses, and new world hanta-
viruses. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2010; 82: 954–60.
19. Communicable Disease Network of Australia. Ebola virus disease (EVD):
CDNA National Guidelines for Public Health Units. Cited 21 Apr 2015.
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-ebola-
Information-for-Health-Professionals.
20. Centers for Disease Control. Guidance for collection, transport and sub-
mission of samples for Ebola virus testing. Cited 27 Apr 2015. http://
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/specimens.html.
21. Ksiazek TG, Rollin PE, Williams AJ, et al. Clinical virology of Ebola
hemorrhagic fever (EHF): virus, virus antigen, and IgG and IgM antibody
ﬁndings among EHF patients in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1995. J Infect Dis 1999; 179 (Suppl 1): S177–87.
22. World Health Organization. Public Report for ReEBOVTM Antigen Rapid
Test Kit (EA 0011-011-00) 2015. Cited 27 Apr 2014. http://www.who.int/
medicines/ebola-treatment/1st_antigen_RT_Ebola/en/.
23. Ksiazek TG, West CP, Rollin PE, et al. ELISA for the detection of
antibodies to Ebola viruses. J Infect Dis 1999; 179 (Suppl 1): S192–8.
VIROLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS OF EBOLAVIRUS INFECTION 413
